#!/usr/bin/python3

# Collect information about a crash and create a report in the directory
# specified by apport.fileutils.report_dir.
# See https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Apport for details.
#
# Copyright (c) 2006 - 2016 Canonical Ltd.
# Author: Martin Pitt <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com>
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
# Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
# option) any later version.  See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html for
# the full text of the license.

import sys, os, os.path, subprocess, time, traceback, pwd, io
import signal, inspect, grp, fcntl, socket, atexit, array, struct
import errno, argparse, stat

import apport, apport.fileutils

#################################################################
#
# functions
#
#################################################################


def check_lock():
    '''Abort if another instance of apport is already running.

    This avoids bringing down the system to its knees if there is a series of
    crashes.'''

    # create a lock file
    try:
        fd = os.open("/var/run/apport.lock",
                     os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_NOFOLLOW, mode=0o600)
    except OSError as e:
        error_log('cannot create lock file (uid %i): %s' % (os.getuid(), str(e)))
        sys.exit(1)

    def error_running(*args):
        error_log('another apport instance is already running, aborting')
        sys.exit(1)

    original_handler = signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, error_running)
    signal.alarm(30)  # Timeout after that many seconds
    try:
        fcntl.lockf(fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
    except IOError:
        error_running()
    finally:
        signal.alarm(0)
        signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, original_handler)


(pidstat, crash_uid, crash_gid, cwd, proc_pid_fd) = (None, None, None, None, None)


def proc_pid_opener(path, flags):
    return os.open(path, flags, dir_fd=proc_pid_fd)


def get_pid_info(pid):
    '''Read /proc information about pid'''

    global pidstat, crash_uid, crash_gid, cwd, proc_pid_fd

    proc_pid_fd = os.open('/proc/%s' % pid, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_PATH | os.O_DIRECTORY)

    # unhandled exceptions on missing or invalidly formatted files are okay
    # here -- we want to know in the log file
    pidstat = os.stat('stat', dir_fd=proc_pid_fd)

    # determine UID and GID of the target process; do *not* use the owner of
    # /proc/pid/stat, as that will be root for setuid or unreadable programs!
    # (this matters when suid_dumpable is enabled)
    with open('status', opener=proc_pid_opener) as status_file:
        contents = status_file.read()
    (crash_uid, crash_gid) = apport.fileutils.get_uid_and_gid(contents)

    assert crash_uid is not None, 'failed to parse Uid'
    assert crash_gid is not None, 'failed to parse Gid'

    cwd = os.open('cwd', os.O_RDONLY | os.O_PATH | os.O_DIRECTORY, dir_fd=proc_pid_fd)


def get_process_starttime():
    '''Get the starttime of the process using proc_pid_fd'''

    with open("stat", opener=proc_pid_opener) as stat_file:
        contents = stat_file.read()
    return apport.fileutils.get_starttime(contents)


def get_apport_starttime():
    '''Get the Apport process starttime'''

    with open("/proc/%s/stat" % os.getpid()) as stat_file:
        contents = stat_file.read()
    return apport.fileutils.get_starttime(contents)


def drop_privileges():
    '''Change effective user and group to crash_[ug]id
    '''
    # Drop any supplemental groups, or we'll still be in the root group
    if os.getuid() == 0:
        os.setgroups([])
        assert os.getgroups() == []
    os.setregid(-1, crash_gid)
    os.setreuid(-1, crash_uid)
    assert os.getegid() == crash_gid
    assert os.geteuid() == crash_uid


def recover_privileges():
    '''Change effective user and group back to real uid and gid
    '''
    os.setregid(-1, os.getgid())
    os.setreuid(-1, os.getuid())
    assert os.getegid() == os.getgid()
    assert os.geteuid() == os.getuid()


def init_error_log():
    '''Open a suitable error log if sys.stderr is not a tty.'''

    if not os.isatty(2):
        log = os.environ.get('APPORT_LOG_FILE', '/var/log/apport.log')
        try:
            f = os.open(log, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_APPEND, 0o600)
            try:
                admgid = grp.getgrnam('adm')[2]
                os.chown(log, -1, admgid)
                os.chmod(log, 0o640)
            except KeyError:
                pass  # if group adm doesn't exist, just leave it as root
        except OSError:  # on a permission error, don't touch stderr
            return
        os.dup2(f, 1)
        os.dup2(f, 2)
        sys.stderr = os.fdopen(2, 'wb')
        if sys.version_info.major >= 3:
            sys.stderr = io.TextIOWrapper(sys.stderr)
        sys.stdout = sys.stderr


def error_log(msg):
    '''Output something to the error log.'''

    apport.error('apport (pid %s) %s: %s', os.getpid(), time.asctime(), msg)


def _log_signal_handler(sgn, frame):
    '''Internal apport signal handler. Just log the signal handler and exit.'''

    # reset handler so that we do not get stuck in loops
    signal.signal(sgn, signal.SIG_IGN)
    try:
        error_log('Got signal %i, aborting; frame:' % sgn)
        for s in inspect.stack():
            error_log(str(s))
    except Exception:
        pass
    sys.exit(1)


def setup_signals():
    '''Install a signal handler for all crash-like signals, so that apport is
    not called on itself when apport crashed.'''

    signal.signal(signal.SIGILL, _log_signal_handler)
    signal.signal(signal.SIGABRT, _log_signal_handler)
    signal.signal(signal.SIGFPE, _log_signal_handler)
    signal.signal(signal.SIGSEGV, _log_signal_handler)
    signal.signal(signal.SIGPIPE, _log_signal_handler)
    signal.signal(signal.SIGBUS, _log_signal_handler)


def write_user_coredump(
    pid, timestamp, limit, coredump_fd=None, from_report=None
):
    '''Write the core into a directory if ulimit requests it.'''

    # three cases:
    # limit == 0: do not write anything
    # limit < 0: unlimited, write out everything
    # limit nonzero: crashed process' core size ulimit in bytes

    if limit == 0:
        return

    # don't write a core dump for suid/sgid/unreadable or otherwise
    # protected executables, in accordance with core(5)
    # (suid_dumpable==2 and core_pattern restrictions); when this happens,
    # /proc/pid/stat is owned by root (or the user suid'ed to), but we already
    # changed to the crashed process' uid
    assert pidstat, 'pidstat not initialized'
    if pidstat.st_uid != crash_uid or pidstat.st_gid != crash_gid:
        error_log('disabling core dump for suid/sgid/unreadable executable')
        return

    (core_name, core_path) = apport.fileutils.get_core_path(pid,
                                                            options.executable_path,
                                                            crash_uid,
                                                            timestamp,
                                                            proc_pid_fd)

    try:
        # Limit number of core files to prevent DoS
        apport.fileutils.clean_core_directory(crash_uid)
        core_file = os.open(core_path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, mode=0o400, dir_fd=cwd)
    except (OSError, IOError):
        return

    error_log('writing core dump to %s (limit: %s)' % (core_name, str(limit)))

    written = 0

    # Priming read
    if from_report:
        r = apport.Report()
        r.load(from_report)
        core_size = len(r['CoreDump'])
        if limit > 0 and core_size > limit:
            error_log('aborting core dump writing, size %i exceeds current limit' % core_size)
            os.close(core_file)
            os.unlink(core_path, dir_fd=cwd)
            return
        error_log('writing core dump %s of size %i' % (core_name, core_size))
        os.write(core_file, r['CoreDump'])
    else:
        block = os.read(coredump_fd, 1048576)

        while True:
            size = len(block)
            if size == 0:
                break
            written += size
            if limit > 0 and written > limit:
                error_log('aborting core dump writing, size exceeds current limit %i' % limit)
                os.close(core_file)
                os.unlink(core_path, dir_fd=cwd)
                return
            if os.write(core_file, block) != size:
                error_log('aborting core dump writing, could not write')
                os.close(core_file)
                os.unlink(core_path, dir_fd=cwd)
                return
            block = os.read(coredump_fd, 1048576)

    # Make sure the user can read it
    os.fchown(core_file, crash_uid, -1)
    os.close(core_file)


def usable_ram():
    '''Return how many bytes of RAM is currently available that can be
    allocated without causing major thrashing.'''

    # abuse our excellent RFC822 parser to parse /proc/meminfo
    r = apport.Report()
    with open('/proc/meminfo', 'rb') as f:
        r.load(f)

    memfree = int(r['MemFree'].split()[0])
    cached = int(r['Cached'].split()[0])
    writeback = int(r['Writeback'].split()[0])

    return (memfree + cached - writeback) * 1024


def _run_with_output_limit_and_timeout(args, output_limit, timeout, close_fds=True, env=None):
    '''Run command like subprocess.run() but with output limit and timeout.

    Return (stdout, stderr).'''

    stdout = b""
    stderr = b""

    process = subprocess.Popen(args, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
                               close_fds=close_fds, env=env)
    try:
        # Don't block so we don't deadlock
        os.set_blocking(process.stdout.fileno(), False)
        os.set_blocking(process.stderr.fileno(), False)

        for _ in range(timeout):
            alive = process.poll() is None

            while len(stdout) < output_limit and len(stderr) < output_limit:
                tempout = process.stdout.read(100)
                if tempout:
                    stdout += tempout
                temperr = process.stderr.read(100)
                if temperr:
                    stderr += temperr
                if not tempout and not temperr:
                    break

            if not alive or len(stdout) >= output_limit or len(stderr) >= output_limit:
                break
            time.sleep(1)
    finally:
        process.kill()

    return stdout, stderr


def is_closing_session():
    '''Check if pid is in a closing user session.

    During that, crashes are common as the session D-BUS and X.org are going
    away, etc. These crash reports are mostly noise, so should be ignored.
    '''
    # Sanity check, don't do anything for root processes
    if crash_uid == 0 or crash_gid == 0:
        return False

    with open('environ', 'rb', opener=proc_pid_opener) as e:
        env = e.read().split(b'\0')
    for e in env:
        if e.startswith(b'DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS='):
            dbus_addr = e.split(b'=', 1)[1].decode()
            break
    else:
        error_log('is_closing_session(): no DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS in environment')
        return False

    dbus_socket = apport.fileutils.get_dbus_socket(dbus_addr)
    if not dbus_socket:
        error_log('is_closing_session(): Could not determine DBUS socket.')
        return False

    if not os.path.exists(dbus_socket):
        error_log("is_closing_session(): DBUS socket doesn't exist.")
        return False

    # We need to drop both the real and effective uid/gid before calling
    # gdbus because DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS is untrusted and may allow
    # reading arbitrary files as a noncefile. We can't just drop effective
    # uid/gid as gdbus has a check to make sure it's not running in a
    # setuid environment and it does so by comparing the real and effective
    # ids. We don't need to drop supplemental groups here, as the privilege
    # dropping code elsewhere has already done so.
    real_uid = os.getuid()
    real_gid = os.getgid()
    try:
        os.setresgid(crash_gid, crash_gid, real_gid)
        os.setresuid(crash_uid, crash_uid, real_uid)
        out, err = _run_with_output_limit_and_timeout(['/usr/bin/gdbus', 'call', '-e', '-d',
                                                       'org.gnome.SessionManager', '-o', '/org/gnome/SessionManager', '-m',
                                                       'org.gnome.SessionManager.IsSessionRunning', '-t', '5'],
                                                      1000, 5, env={'DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS': dbus_addr})

        if err:
            error_log('gdbus call error: ' + err.decode('UTF-8'))
    except OSError as e:
        error_log('gdbus call failed, cannot determine running session: ' + str(e))
        return False
    finally:
        os.setresuid(real_uid, real_uid, -1)
        os.setresgid(real_gid, real_gid, -1)

    error_log('debug: session gdbus call: ' + out.decode('UTF-8'))
    if out.startswith(b'(false,'):
        return True

    return False


def is_systemd_watchdog_restart(signum):
    '''Check if this is a restart by systemd's watchdog'''

    if signum != str(signal.SIGABRT) or not os.path.isdir('/run/systemd/system'):
        return False

    try:
        with open('cgroup', opener=proc_pid_opener) as f:
            for line in f:
                if 'name=systemd:' in line:
                    unit = line.split('/')[-1].strip()
                    break
            else:
                return False

        journalctl = subprocess.Popen(['/bin/journalctl', '--output=cat', '--since=-5min', '--priority=warning',
                                       '--unit', unit], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
        out = journalctl.communicate()[0]
        return b'Watchdog timeout' in out
    except (IOError, OSError) as e:
        error_log('cannot determine if this crash is from systemd watchdog: %s' % e)
        return False


def is_same_ns(pid, ns):
    if not os.path.exists('/proc/self/ns/%s' % ns) or \
            not os.path.exists('/proc/%s/ns/%s' % (pid, ns)):
        # If the namespace doesn't exist, then it's obviously shared
        return True

    try:
        if os.readlink('/proc/%s/ns/%s' % (pid, ns)) == os.readlink('/proc/self/ns/%s' % ns):
            # Check that the inode for both namespaces is the same
            return True
    except OSError as e:
        if e.errno == errno.ENOENT:
            return True
        else:
            raise

    # check to see if the process is part of the system.slice (LP: #1870060)
    if os.path.exists('/proc/%s/cgroup' % pid):

        global proc_pid_fd
        proc_pid_fd = os.open('/proc/%s' % pid, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_PATH | os.O_DIRECTORY)

        with open('cgroup', opener=proc_pid_opener) as cgroup:
            for line in cgroup:
                fields = line.split(':')
                if fields[-1].startswith('/system.slice'):
                    return True

    return False


def parse_arguments():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(epilog="""
    Alternatively, the following command line is understood for legacy hosts:
        <pid> <signal number> <core file ulimit> <dump mode> [global pid] [exe path]
    """)

    # TODO: Use type=int
    parser.add_argument("-p", "--pid", help="process id (%%p)")
    parser.add_argument("-s", "--signal-number", help="signal number (%%s)")
    parser.add_argument("-c", "--core-ulimit", help="core ulimit (%%c)")
    parser.add_argument("-d", "--dump-mode", help="dump mode (%%d)")
    parser.add_argument("-P", "--global-pid", help="pid in root namespace (%%P)")
    parser.add_argument("-u", "--uid", type=int, help="real UID (%%u)")
    parser.add_argument("-g", "--gid", type=int, help="real GID (%%g)")
    parser.add_argument("executable_path", nargs='*', help="path of executable (%%E)")

    options, rest = parser.parse_known_args()

    # Legacy command line needs to remain for the scenario where a more
    # recent apport is running inside a container with an older apport
    # running on the host.
    if options.pid is None and len(sys.argv) == 5:
        # Translate legacy command line
        return argparse.Namespace(
            pid=sys.argv[1],
            signal_number=sys.argv[2],
            core_ulimit=sys.argv[3],
            dump_mode=sys.argv[4],
            global_pid=None,
            uid=None,
            gid=None,
            executable_path=None,
        )

    if options.pid is None:
        parser.print_usage()
        sys.exit(1)

    for arg in rest:
        error_log("Unknown argument: %s" % arg)

    # In kernels before 5.3.0, an executable path with spaces may be split
    # into separate arguments. If options.executable_path is a list, join
    # it back into a string. Also restore directory separators.
    if isinstance(options.executable_path, list):
        options.executable_path = " ".join(options.executable_path)
    options.executable_path = options.executable_path.replace('!', '/')
    # Sanity check to prevent trickery later on
    if '../' in options.executable_path:
        options.executable_path = None

    return options


#################################################################
#
# main
#
#################################################################

init_error_log()

# systemd socket activation
if 'LISTEN_FDS' in os.environ:
    try:
        from systemd.daemon import listen_fds
    except ImportError:
        error_log('Received a crash via apport-forward.socket, but systemd python module is not installed')
        sys.exit(0)

    # Extract and validate the fd
    fds = listen_fds()
    if len(fds) < 1:
        error_log('Invalid socket activation, no fd provided')
        sys.exit(1)

    # Open the socket
    sock = socket.fromfd(int(fds[0]), socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    atexit.register(sock.shutdown, socket.SHUT_RDWR)

    # Replace stdin by the socket activation fd
    sys.stdin.close()

    fds = array.array('i')
    ucreds = array.array('i')
    msg, ancdata, flags, addr = sock.recvmsg(4096, 4096)
    for cmsg_level, cmsg_type, cmsg_data in ancdata:
        if (cmsg_level == socket.SOL_SOCKET and cmsg_type == socket.SCM_RIGHTS):
            fds.fromstring(cmsg_data[:len(cmsg_data) - (len(cmsg_data) % fds.itemsize)])
        elif (cmsg_level == socket.SOL_SOCKET and cmsg_type == socket.SCM_CREDENTIALS):
            ucreds.fromstring(cmsg_data[:len(cmsg_data) - (len(cmsg_data) % ucreds.itemsize)])

    sys.stdin = os.fdopen(int(fds[0]), 'r')

    # Replace argv by the arguments received over the socket
    sys.argv = [sys.argv[0]]
    sys.argv += msg.decode().split()
    if len(ucreds) >= 3:
        sys.argv[1] = "%d" % ucreds[0]

    if len(sys.argv) != 5:
        error_log('Received a bad number of arguments from forwarder, received %d, expected 5, aborting.' % len(sys.argv))
        sys.exit(1)


options = parse_arguments()

# Check if we received a valid global PID (kernel >= 3.12). If we do,
# then compare it with the local PID. If they don't match, it's an
# indication that the crash originated from another PID namespace.
# Simply log an entry in the host error log and exit 0.
if options.global_pid is not None:
    host_pid = int(options.global_pid)

    if not is_same_ns(host_pid, "pid") and not is_same_ns(host_pid, "mnt"):
        # If the crash came from a container, don't attempt to handle
        # locally as that would just result in wrong system information.

        # Instead, attempt to find apport inside the container and
        # forward the process information there.

        proc_host_pid_fd = os.open('/proc/%d' % host_pid, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_PATH | os.O_DIRECTORY)

        def proc_host_pid_opener(path, flags):
            return os.open(path, flags, dir_fd=proc_host_pid_fd)

        # Validate that the target socket is owned by the user namespace of the process
        try:
            sock_fd = os.open("root/run/apport.socket", os.O_RDONLY | os.O_PATH, dir_fd=proc_host_pid_fd)
            socket_uid = os.fstat(sock_fd).st_uid
        except FileNotFoundError:
            error_log('host pid %s crashed in a container without apport support' %
                      options.global_pid)
            sys.exit(0)

        try:
            with open("uid_map", "r", opener=proc_host_pid_opener) as fd:
                if not apport.fileutils.search_map(fd, socket_uid):
                    error_log("user is trying to trick apport into accessing a socket that doesn't belong to the container")
                    sys.exit(0)
        except FileNotFoundError:
            pass

        # Validate that the crashed binary is owned by the user namespace of the process
        task_uid = os.stat("exe", dir_fd=proc_host_pid_fd).st_uid
        try:
            with open("uid_map", "r", opener=proc_host_pid_opener) as fd:
                if not apport.fileutils.search_map(fd, task_uid):
                    error_log("host pid %s crashed in a container with no access to the binary"
                              % options.global_pid)
                    sys.exit(0)
        except FileNotFoundError:
            pass

        task_gid = os.stat("exe", dir_fd=proc_host_pid_fd).st_gid
        try:
            with open("gid_map", "r", opener=proc_host_pid_opener) as fd:
                if not apport.fileutils.search_map(fd, task_gid):
                    error_log("host pid %s crashed in a container with no access to the binary"
                              % options.global_pid)
                    sys.exit(0)
        except FileNotFoundError:
            pass

        # Now open the socket
        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
        try:
            sock.connect('/proc/self/fd/%s' % sock_fd)
        except Exception:
            error_log('host pid %s crashed in a container with a broken apport' %
                      options.global_pid)
            sys.exit(0)

        # Send main arguments only
        # Older apport in containers doesn't support positional arguments
        args = "%s %s %s %s" % (options.pid,
                                options.signal_number,
                                options.core_ulimit,
                                options.dump_mode)
        try:
            sock.sendmsg([args.encode()], [
                # Send a ucred containing the global pid
                (socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SCM_CREDENTIALS, struct.pack("3i", host_pid, 0, 0)),

                # Send fd 0 (the coredump)
                (socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SCM_RIGHTS, array.array('i', [0]))])
            sock.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
        except Exception:
            error_log('Container apport failed to process crash within 30s')

        sys.exit(0)
    elif not is_same_ns(host_pid, "mnt"):
        error_log('host pid %s crashed in a separate mount namespace, ignoring' % host_pid)
        sys.exit(0)
    else:
        # If it doesn't look like the crash originated from within a
        # full container or if the is_same_ns() function fails open (returning
        # True), then take the global pid and replace the local pid with it,
        # then move on to normal handling.

        # This bit is needed because some software like the chrome
        # sandbox will use container namespaces as a security measure but are
        # still otherwise host processes. When that's the case, we need to keep
        # handling those crashes locally using the global pid.
        options.pid = str(host_pid)

check_lock()

try:
    setup_signals()

    pid = options.pid
    signum = options.signal_number
    core_ulimit = options.core_ulimit
    dump_mode = options.dump_mode
    coredump_fd = sys.stdin.fileno()

    get_pid_info(pid)

    # Sanity check to make sure the process wasn't replaced after the crash
    # happened. The start time isn't fine-grained enough to be an adequate
    # security check.
    apport_start = get_apport_starttime()
    process_start = get_process_starttime()
    if process_start > apport_start:
        error_log('process was replaced after Apport started, ignoring')
        sys.exit(0)

    # Make sure the process uid/gid match the ones provided by the kernel
    # if available, if not, it may have been replaced
    if (options.uid is not None) and (options.gid is not None):
        if (options.uid != crash_uid) or (options.gid != crash_gid):
            error_log("process uid/gid doesn't match expected, ignoring")
            sys.exit(0)

    # check if the executable was modified after the process started (e. g.
    # package got upgraded in between).
    exe_mtime = os.stat('exe', dir_fd=proc_pid_fd).st_mtime
    process_mtime = os.lstat('cmdline', dir_fd=proc_pid_fd).st_mtime
    if not os.path.exists(os.readlink('exe', dir_fd=proc_pid_fd)) or exe_mtime > process_mtime:
        error_log('executable was modified after program start, ignoring')
        sys.exit(0)

    error_log('called for pid %s, signal %s, core limit %s, dump mode %s' % (pid, signum, core_ulimit, dump_mode))

    try:
        core_ulimit = int(core_ulimit)
    except ValueError:
        error_log('core limit is invalid, disabling core files')
        core_ulimit = 0
    # clamp core_ulimit to a sensible size, for -1 the kernel reports something
    # absurdly big
    if core_ulimit > 9223372036854775807:
        error_log('ignoring implausibly big core limit, treating as unlimited')
        core_ulimit = -1

    if dump_mode == '2':
        error_log('not creating core for pid with dump mode of %s' % (dump_mode))
        # a report should be created but not a core file
        core_ulimit = 0

    # ignore SIGQUIT (it's usually deliberately generated by users)
    if signum == str(int(signal.SIGQUIT)):
        write_user_coredump(pid, process_start, core_ulimit, coredump_fd)
        sys.exit(0)

    info = apport.Report('Crash')
    info['Signal'] = signum
    core_size_limit = usable_ram() * 3 / 4
    if sys.version_info.major < 3:
        info['CoreDump'] = (sys.stdin, True, core_size_limit, True)
    else:
        # read binary data from stdio
        info['CoreDump'] = (sys.stdin.detach(), True, core_size_limit, True)

    # We already need this here to figure out the ExecutableName (for scripts,
    # etc).
    if options.executable_path is not None and os.path.exists(options.executable_path):
        info['ExecutablePath'] = options.executable_path
    else:
        info['ExecutablePath'] = os.readlink('exe', dir_fd=proc_pid_fd)

    # Drop privileges temporarily to make sure that we don't
    # include information in the crash report that the user should
    # not be allowed to access.
    drop_privileges()

    info.add_proc_info(proc_pid_fd=proc_pid_fd)

    if 'ExecutablePath' not in info:
        error_log('could not determine ExecutablePath, aborting')
        sys.exit(1)

    subject = info['ExecutablePath'].replace('/', '_')
    base = '%s.%s.%s.hanging' % (subject, str(pidstat.st_uid), pid)
    hanging = os.path.join(apport.fileutils.report_dir, base)

    if os.path.exists(hanging):
        if (os.stat('/proc/uptime').st_ctime < os.stat(hanging).st_mtime):
            info['ProblemType'] = 'Hang'
        os.unlink(hanging)

    if 'InterpreterPath' in info:
        error_log('script: %s, interpreted by %s (command line "%s")' %
                  (info['ExecutablePath'], info['InterpreterPath'],
                   info['ProcCmdline']))
    else:
        error_log('executable: %s (command line "%s")' %
                  (info['ExecutablePath'], info['ProcCmdline']))

    # ignore non-package binaries (unless configured otherwise)
    if not apport.fileutils.likely_packaged(info['ExecutablePath']):
        if not apport.fileutils.get_config('main', 'unpackaged', False, bool=True):
            error_log('executable does not belong to a package, ignoring')
            # check if the user wants a core dump
            recover_privileges()
            write_user_coredump(pid, process_start, core_ulimit, coredump_fd)
            sys.exit(0)

    # ignore SIGXCPU and SIGXFSZ since this indicates some external
    # influence changing soft RLIMIT values when running programs.
    if signum in [str(signal.SIGXCPU), str(signal.SIGXFSZ)]:
        error_log('Ignoring signal %s (caused by exceeding soft RLIMIT)' % signum)
        recover_privileges()
        write_user_coredump(pid, process_start, core_ulimit, coredump_fd)
        sys.exit(0)

    # ignore blacklisted binaries
    if info.check_ignored():
        error_log('executable version is blacklisted, ignoring')
        sys.exit(0)

    # We can now recover privileges to create the crash report file and
    # write out the user coredumps
    recover_privileges()

    if is_closing_session():
        error_log('happens for shutting down session, ignoring')
        sys.exit(0)

    # ignore systemd watchdog kills; most often they don't tell us the actual
    # reason (kernel hang, etc.), LP #1433320
    if is_systemd_watchdog_restart(signum):
        error_log('Ignoring systemd watchdog restart')
        sys.exit(0)

    crash_counter = 0

    # Create crash report file descriptor for writing the report into
    # report_dir
    try:
        report = '%s/%s.%i.crash' % (apport.fileutils.report_dir, info['ExecutablePath'].replace('/', '_'), pidstat.st_uid)
        if os.path.exists(report):
            if apport.fileutils.seen_report(report):
                # do not flood the logs and the user with repeated crashes
                # and make sure the file isn't a FIFO or symlink
                fd = os.open(report, os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NONBLOCK)
                st = os.fstat(fd)
                if stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
                    with os.fdopen(fd, 'rb') as f:
                        crash_counter = apport.fileutils.get_recent_crashes(f)
                    crash_counter += 1
                    if crash_counter > 1:
                        write_user_coredump(
                            pid, process_start, core_ulimit, coredump_fd
                        )
                        error_log('this executable already crashed %i times, ignoring' % crash_counter)
                        sys.exit(0)
                # remove the old file, so that we can create the new one with
                # os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL
                os.unlink(report)
            else:
                error_log('apport: report %s already exists and unseen, skipping to avoid disk usage DoS' % report)
                write_user_coredump(
                    pid, process_start, core_ulimit, coredump_fd
                )
                sys.exit(0)
        # we prefer having a file mode of 0 while writing;
        fd = os.open(report, os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0)
        reportfile = os.fdopen(fd, 'w+b')
        assert reportfile.fileno() > sys.stderr.fileno()

        # Make sure the crash reporting daemon can read this report
        try:
            gid = pwd.getpwnam('whoopsie').pw_gid
            os.fchown(fd, pidstat.st_uid, gid)
        except (OSError, KeyError):
            os.fchown(fd, pidstat.st_uid, pidstat.st_gid)
    except (OSError, IOError) as e:
        error_log('Could not create report file: %s' % str(e))
        sys.exit(1)

    # Drop privileges before writing out the reportfile.
    drop_privileges()

    info.add_user_info()
    info.add_os_info()

    if crash_counter > 0:
        info['CrashCounter'] = '%i' % crash_counter

    try:
        info.write(reportfile)
    except IOError:
        os.unlink(report)
        raise
    if 'CoreDump' not in info:
        error_log('core dump exceeded %i MiB, dropped from %s to avoid memory overflow'
                  % (core_size_limit / 1048576, report))

    # Get privileges back so the core file can be written to root-owned
    # corefile directory
    recover_privileges()

    # make the report writable now, when it's completely written
    os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
    error_log('wrote report %s' % report)

    # Check if the user wants a core file. We need to create that from the
    # written report, as we can only read stdin once and write_user_coredump()
    # might abort reading from stdin and remove the written core file when
    # core_ulimit is > 0 and smaller than the core size.
    reportfile.seek(0)
    write_user_coredump(pid, process_start, core_ulimit, from_report=reportfile)

except (SystemExit, KeyboardInterrupt):
    raise
except Exception:
    error_log('Unhandled exception:')
    traceback.print_exc()
    error_log('pid: %i, uid: %i, gid: %i, euid: %i, egid: %i' % (
              os.getpid(), os.getuid(), os.getgid(), os.geteuid(), os.getegid()))
    error_log('environment: %s' % str(os.environ))